Couplings in Multi-criterion Aerodynamic Optimization Problems Using Adjoint Methods and Game Strategies  by Zhili, Tang & Jun, Dong
  
Chinese 
Journal of 
Aeronautics 
Chinese Journal of Aeronautics 22(2009) 1-8 www.elsevier.com/locate/cja
Couplings in Multi-criterion Aerodynamic Optimization 
Problems Using Adjoint Methods and Game Strategies 
Tang Zhilia,*, Dong Junb 
aCollege of Aerospace Engineering, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China 
bChinese Aerodynamic Research Institute on Aeronautics, Shenyang 110034, China 
Received 9 January 2008; accepted 4 August 2008 
Abstract 
The tighten couplings of game strategies with adjoint methods for multi-criterion aerodynamic design optimization are ad-
dressed. Its numerical implementation is also described in details. In cooperative game, adjoint methods are coupled in parallel to 
compute Pareto front collaboratively. Conversely in a Nash game, adjoint methods are coupled in each player’s decision making 
to achieve Nash equilibrium competitively. In Stackelberg game, adjoint methods used by players are nested hierarchically 
through incomplete and complete decisions of the leader and followers respectively. Several design examples illustrate the effi-
ciency of the coupling algorithms for multi-criterion aerodynamic design optimization problems. 
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1. Introduction1 
There are three different game strategies[1-4] cur-
rently used in economics: cooperative games (Pare- 
to)[5-6], competitive games (Nash)[7], and hierarchical 
games (Stackelberg)[2-3]. Each game provides different 
solution with different performance with economical 
scenarios. Here, in the context of aerospace engineer-
ing, we introduce the concept of game in aerodynamic 
design, where players are assigned the management of 
criteria and disciplines, and couple it with adjoint 
methods[8-9] to solve multi-criterion aerodynamic opti-
mization problems. The adjoint methodology is used 
as a deterministic optimizer. Furthermore, the above 
optimizer operates with the ingredients derived from 
game theory to treat multi-point airfoil optimization. 
This article describes the coupled implementation of 
adjoint methods within different game strategies with 
the physics modeled by Euler flow analyzers. In a 
Pareto game, players take collaborative decisions with 
their global resources through only one parameterized 
objective function associated to the game, such those 
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adjoint methods can be implemented in parallel for 
different values of weight aggregated criteria. Con-
versely, in a Nash game, each player with his own 
optimizer attempts to reach his own target via a sym-
metric exchange of information with others and nu-
merically, the initial parameters of the two adjoint 
methods running in parallel are coupled at the end of 
each iteration by an exchange of each player’s design 
variable. Finally, in a Stackelberg game, a hierarchy 
between players is introduced as follows: one player 
acts as a “leader” (with some strategy terminology), 
receiving complete information from other players 
named “followers”; in this situation, adjoint methods 
used by players are nested hierarchically through in-
complete and complete decisions of the leader and 
followers, respectively. 
The equilibrium point performances of three game 
strategies were emphasized theoretically in Ref.[10]. 
This article focused on the tighten couplings and their 
numerical implementations of game strategies coupled 
with adjoint methods for multi-criterion aerodynamic 
design optimization. Several CFD design problems 
involving objective functions like drag reduction and 
lift maximization of airfoils operating in transonic and 
subsonic Euler flows are compared in terms of quality 
and efficiency with respect to selected games and pro-
posed as efficient decision maker tools to the designer. 
1000-9361© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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2. Game Strategies for Multi-objective Optimi- 
zation 
2.1. Cooperative games: Pareto optimal front[5-6] 
A general multi-objective optimization problem can 
be stated as follows 
min (or max) ( ) ( 1,2, , )if i N X        (1) 
where fi is the cost function, N the number of objec-
tives, and X a vector whose p components are the de-
sign or decision variables. 
In a minimization problem, a variable x1 is said to be 
partially less than another variable x2 when ,i  
1 2( ) ( ), 1,2, ,i if x f x i Nd    , and there exists at least 
one i such that 1 2( ) ( )i if x f x . Then we say that solu-
tion x1 dominates solution x2, which is a set of nondo-
minated solutions known as the Pareto optimal front. 
2.2. Competitive games: Nash game 
Nash optima define a noncooperative multiple ob-
jective optimization approach, firstly proposed by J.F. 
Nash[7].  
Suppose the minimization problem is 
1
2
min ( , )
min ( , )
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f x y
f x y

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               (2) 
If ( *, *)x y  is said to be a Nash equilibrium, if and 
only if 
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2.3. Hierarchical games: Stackelberg game[2-3] 
Stackelberg strategy can be summarized as: one 
player acts as a leader, and all the other agents (the 
followers) react independently and selfishly relative to 
the leader’s strategy. In mathematics, it can be stated 
as: 
Suppose we have a triple criterion optimization 
problem as follows 
1
2
3
min ( , , )
min ( , , )
min ( , , )
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y
z
f x y z
f x y z
f x y z



½°°¾°°¿
X
Y
Z
              (4) 
Furthermore, we assume that f1 is leader, and f2 and f3 
are followers. So the Stackelberg solution is ( *', *,x y  
*)z , where 
1*' inf ( , *, *)xx f x y z X              (5) 
and ( *, *)y z  is the best solution of followers, e.g. 
Nash equilibrium 
2
3
* inf ( *', , *)
* inf ( *', *, )
y
z
y f x y z
z f x y z


 ½°¾ °¿
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Z
             (6) 
So, there are two iteration strategies to compute 
Stackelberg equilibrium numerically. One is leader/ 
followers strategy, and the other is incentive strategy. 
3. Adjoint Method for Aerodynamic Design[8-9] 
The basic optimizer in this article is the determinis-
tic optimization method, and the gradient is computed 
by solving an adjoint equations. The governing equa-
tions for inviscid compressible flow are 2D Euler 
equations. Suppose that it is desired to achieve a speci-
fied pressure distribution pd on airfoil surface. Intro-
duce the cost functional 
2
d
1 ( ) d
2 c
J p p s* ³v             (7) 
According control theory, the adjoint equations and 
the gradient computation are as follows 
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where : is the domain of flow field, and *B and *c are 
the far field and solid boundaries of the domain, re-
spectively. 
Once the parameterization of airfoil is chosen and 
the gradient is established, we can modify the airfoil in 
its negative gradient direction. 
4. Couplings Between Adjoint Methods and    
Game Strategies in Multi-criterion Aerody-  
namic Design Optimization 
4.1. Numerical procedure of Pareto front strategy 
coupled with adjoint methods[10-11] 
In general, a multi-objective optimization problem 
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consists of a number of objectives to be optimized 
simultaneously,  
1 2
1 2( , , , )
min ( , , , , , ) ( 1,2, , )
n
i i nx x x
f x x x x i n            (11) 
Thus, we have n players, and Player i is responsible 
for minimization of fi by modifying the global design 
variables. A numerical procedure of Pareto/adjoint 
method is described below: 
Step 0 (Initialization): input the weighting constant 
, 1, 2, ,i i nO   , then the Pareto strategy is to solve the 
following problem: 
1 2
1 2( , , , ) 1
min ( , , , , , )
n
n
i i i nx x x i
f f x x x xO      ¦      (12) 
Optimization starts from an initial guess 
old old
1( ,x X  old old old2 , , , , )i nx x x      , then 
Do loop for Pareto strategy cycles 
Do loop for adjoint based design methods (for each 
objective fi, the following steps are run simultaneously 
on different processor) 
Step 1: run the CFD solver, outputs being Cl, Cd and 
the flow field variables. 
Step 2: run the adjoint solver. 
Step 3: compute the global gradient of cost function 
fi with respect to the global design variables 
1 2( , , ,x x     , , )i nx x   . 
End of adjoint iteration 
Step 4: get the total gradient of entire cost function f 
with respect to global design variables as follows 
rad
1
dd
d d
n
i
i
i
ff O
 
  ¦G X X            (13) 
Step 5: modify the geometry according to the total 
gradient and obtain new global design variables 
new  X  new new new new1 2( , , , , , )i nx x x x      . 
Step 6: if the 2rad HdG , then, Pareto strategy stops, 
otherwise old new X X , go to the beginning of Pareto 
strategy cycles. 
End of Pareto computation 
The flow chart of this coupling is shown in Fig.1. 
 
Fig.1  Pareto front strategy coupled with adjoint methods. 
4.2. Numerical procedure of Nash game strategy  
coupled with adjoint methods[12-14] 
Suppose for the dual criterion optimization problem, 
where the two cost functions are f1 and f2. Furthermore, 
let’s assume that both are minimization problems. So 
we have two players, Player 1 is responsible for the 
minimization of f1, and Player 2 is responsible for the 
minimization of f2. A numerical procedure of Nash/ 
adjoint method is described below: 
Step 0 (Initialization): specify Nash strategy and 
split the design variables X in respect to the physics of 
the optimization problem and the flow field character-
istics. For example X = (x1, x2), then Nash strategy is 
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as follows 
1
2
1 1 2
2 1 2
Player 1: min ( , )
Player 2 : min ( , )
x
x
f x x
f x x
½°¾°¿
         (14) 
Optimization starts from an initial guess old old1 2( , )x x , 
then 
Do loop for Nash strategy cycles 
Load each player’s optimization task on independent 
processor simultaneously, and run at each own design 
point. For Player i, adjust xi to minimize fi, where i = 
1,2. 
Do loop from k = 1,2,···,K of adjoint based design 
methods to optimize fi by Player i 
Step 1: run the CFD solver, outputs being Cl, Cd and 
the flow field variables. 
Step 2: run the adjoint solver. 
Step 3: compute the global gradient of fi with re-
spect to X. 
Step 4: project the global gradient into the corre-
sponding subspace, to obtain i if xw w . 
Step 5: modify the partial design variables to get a 
tentative partially updated aerodynamic configuration. 
End of adjoint iterations 
Obtain new partial design variables newix  
Step 6: symmetric information exchanges and con-
sists a new global design variables new new1( ,x X  
new
2 )x , then, update the whole aerodynamic configura-
tion. 
Step 7: identify if Nash equilibrium is reached or 
not. If yes, we get 1 2( *, *)x x and process stops, other-
wise old new X X , go to the beginning of Nash strat-
egy. 
End of Nash cycles 
The flow chart of this coupling is shown in Fig.2. 
 
Fig.2  Nash game strategy coupled with adjoint methods. 
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4.3. Numerical procedure of Stackelberg game    
strategy coupled with adjoint methods[10] 
(1) Leader/Follower Stackelberg strategy 
Suppose for the triple criterion optimization prob-
lem, three cost functions are f1, f2, and f3, and they are 
all minimization problems. So, we have three players, 
wherein Player 1 is responsible for the minimization of 
f1, Player 2 is responsible for the minimization of f2, 
and Player 3 is responsible for the minimization of f3. 
We further assume that f1 is leader, and f2 and f3 are 
followers. A numerical procedure of leader/followers 
Stackelberg/adjoint method is described below: 
Step 0 (Initialization): specify Stackelberg strategy 
and split the design variables X with the physics of the 
optimization problem and the flow field characteristics. 
For example 1 2 3( , , )x x x X , then Stackelberg stra- 
tegy is as follows 
1
2
3
1 1 2 3
2 1 2 3
3 1 2 3
Leader Player 1: min ( , , )
Player 2 : min ( , , )
Followers
Player 3 : min ( , , )
x
x
x
f x x x
f x x x
f x x x
½°°­ ¾° °® °°¯ ¿
 (15) 
Then, optimization starts from an initial guess old1( ,x  
old old
2 3, )x x . 
Do loop for Stackelberg strategy cycles 
Load the leader’s optimization task on a processor 
first. That means to adjust x1 by minimizing f1 firstly, 
this needs the adjoint optimization iterations. 
Do loop from k = 1,2,···,K of adjoint based design 
methods to optimize f1 by leader 
Step 1: run the CFD solver, outputs being Cl, Cd and 
the flow field variables. 
Step 2: run the adjoint solver. 
Step 3: compute the global gradient. 
Step 4: project the global gradient into the corre-
spond- ing subspace. 
Step 5: modify the partial design variables to get a 
tentative partially updated aerodynamic shape. 
End of adjoint iterations 
Obtain new partial design variables new1x . 
Then, load the followers’ Nash optimization task, 
and specify the optimization task of each player of 
followers on the independent processor to make deci-
sion simultaneously based on the basis of decision of 
leader, i.e. new1x . This needs a Nash strategy cycles, 
and Nash optimization starts from new old old1 2 3( , , )x x x , 
then, 
Do loop of Nash strategy cycles of followers 
For Player i, adjust xi to minimize fi, where 2,3i  . 
Do loop from k = 1,2,···,K of adjoint based design 
methods to optimize fi of followers 
Step 6: run the CFD solver, outputs being Cl, Cd and 
the flow field variables. 
Step 7: run the adjoint solver. 
Step 8: compute the global gradient of fi with re-
spect to X. 
Step 9: project the global gradient into the corre-
sponding subspace to obtain i if xw w . 
Step 10: modify the partial design variables to get a 
tentative partially updated aerodynamic configuration. 
End of adjoint iterations 
Obtain new partial design variables newix . 
Step 11: symmetric information exchange and con-
sists of a new Nash design variables new new2 3( , )x x  of 
followers. 
Step 12: identify if Nash equilibrium is reached or 
not. If yes, we get 2 3( *, *)x x , then, go to Step 13, oth-
erwise old new old new2 2 3 3,x x x x  , go to the beginning of 
Nash strategy cycles. 
End of Nash cycles 
Step 13: identify if Stackelberg equilibrium is 
reached or not. If yes, we get the final Stackelberg 
equilibrium 1 2 3( *', *, *)x x x , then, the procedure stops, 
otherwise old new old old1 1 2 2 3 3, *, and *x x x x x x    go to 
the beginning of Stackelberg strategy cycles. 
End of Stackelberg cycles 
The flow chart of this coupling is shown in Fig.3. 
(2) Incentive Stackelberg strategy 
For the Stackelberg game strategy defined in 
Eq.(15), numerical implementation of incentive strat-
egy is as inverse as the above. 
5. Optimization Examples and Results 
5.1. Two-objective inverse aerodynamic design pro- 
blem[10-11,15-17] 
The following numerical results show the coupling 
effect in three game strategies for solving the 
two-objective inverse design problem in aerodynamics 
defined below:  
d 2
1 1
d 2
2 2
min ( ) ( ) d
at 0.20, 10.8
min ( ) ( ) d
at 0.77, 1.0
cc
cc
c c
c c
f p p
Ma
f p p
Ma
**
**
* *
D
* *
D
f
f
½  °°  °¾  °°°  ¿
³
³
D
D
v
v       (16) 
where *c denotes the airfoil shape, d1p  the pressure 
distribution on a “high-lift” profile at 0.20Maf  , 
10.8D  D , and d2p  the pressure distribution on a 
“low-drag” profile at 0.77, 1.0Ma Df   D . The de-
signer is interested to find the compromised profiles 
solutions existing between the low-drag profile and the 
high-lift one. 
In a Nash game, the split of the design variables is 
denoted front/rear. Player 1 designs the leading edge 
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Fig.3  Leader/Followers Stackelberg strategy coupled with adjoint methods. 
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(front) (see Fig.4) to reconstruct the subsonic per-
formance, and Player 2 designs the remaining portion 
of airfoil (rear) to reconstruct the transonic perform-
ance. The mathematical description of the multi-crite-
ria optimization problem is as follows: 
 
front
rear
front rear d 2
1 1
front rear d 2
2 2
min ( , ) ( ) d
min ( , ) ( ) d
cc
cc
c c c
c c c
f p p
f p p
**
**
* * *
* * *
½  °¾  °¿
³
³
v
v
  (17) 
In a Stackelberg strategy, if f1 is leader, and f2 is fol-
lower, then Player 1 optimizes the red portion of airfoil 
on the basis of the fully converged solution of Player 2. 
Conversely, in the case of f2 as leader and f1 as follower, 
the optimization strategy is inverse to the previous one. 
The associated mathematical descriptions of the two 
problems are given below: 
(1) Player 1 is leader, Player 2 is follower 
front
rear
front *rear d 2
1 1
*rear
front rear d 2
2 2
min ( , ) ( ) d
where is the solution of
min ( , ) ( ) d
cc
cc
c c c
c
c c c
f p p
f p p
**
**
* * *
*
* * *
½  °°¾°  °¿
³
³
v
v
  (18) 
(2) Player 2 is leader, Player 1 is follower 
rear
front
*front rear d 2
2 2
*front
*front rear d 1
1 2
min ( , ) ( ) d
where is the solution of
min ( , ) ( ) d
cc
cc
c c c
c
c c c
f p p
f p p
**
**
* * *
*
* * *
½  °°¾°  °¿
³
³
v
v
  (19) 
Fig.4 shows the territory splitting and design strate-
gies used in Nash and Stackelberg games. Fig.5 de-
scribes the interaction of above three game equilibria. 
The numerical results show clearly that all the non-
cooperative equilibria solutions are inferior to the 
Pareto front (see Fig.5). But they are still the good 
satisfactory solutions of multi-objective optimization 
problem. This is because of the factor that the best 
nondominated solution is obtained by cooperative 
strategy and the design space is modified globally dur-
ing the optimization. Nash and Stackelberg equilibria 
are noncooperative games, and the design space is 
modified partly within each player’s optimization. 
However, the CPU cost to capture a set of solutions 
 
Fig.4  Airfoil splitting and game strategies. 
 
Fig.5  Performance comparison of Pareto front with Nash 
and Stackelberg equilibria. 
makes the Pareto front an expensive optimizer to the 
designer. 
5.2. Design with uncertainties[11,14,18-19] 
For a drag reduction problem with uncertainty of 
flight condition can be defined as follows 
b b
*
thickness thickness
min at [ , ]
subject to and 
c
d
l lb
C Ma Ma Ma
C C T T
* H Hf    ½°¾°  ¿
   (20) 
where Mab is the standard design point Mach number, 
H variability of Mach number, and Clb the lift coeffi-
cient at the standard design point. 
According to Taguchi robust control methods, the 
above design problem can be converted into the fol-
lowing multi-objective optimization as follows 
2
1 2
1 b
b b
2
2
2 2
1 b
*
thickness thickness
1min
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1min ( )
1
Subject to  and 
c
c
K
i
d di
i
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f C C
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H H
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f
 
f
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½  °°°   °¾°   ° °°  ¿
¦
¦
   (21) 
where f1 and f2 are two criteria or cost functions repre-
senting the discrete averaged drag and variance of the 
drag, respectively. 
In this section, numerical experiments are performed 
on a personal computer to illustrate the robust design 
methodology on shape optimization by using game 
strategy coupled with the adjoint methods. The uncer-
tainty range of the Mach number is given within the 
following interval [0.75 – 0.1, 0.75 + 0.1]. At first, we 
discrete this interval into five design points [0.74, 
0.745, 0.75, 0.755, 0.76]. The initial shape guess is the 
NACA 2412 airfoil and the two considered criteria are 
the mean value (performances) of drag and its variance 
(stability); finally, inviscid flow analyzers are modeled 
by the Euler equations. 
Fig.6 shows the computed Pareto set of nondomi-
nated solutions obtained by a multi-objective determi-
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nistic optimizer minimizing simultaneously the mean 
value and the variance of the drag of an airfoil. Fig.7 
shows the drag performances of optimized airfoils 
located on the Pareto front with robust design. All 
these results have been obtained with the Euler mathe-
matical model used for the inviscid compressible flow 
analyzer. The Nash solution has also been computed as 
a conflicting game between Player 1 in charge of 
minimizing the mean value and Player 2 in charge of 
minimizing the variance of the drag. The correspond-
ing Nash equilibrium is shown on the same figure and 
compared to the Pareto solutions. 
 
Fig.6  Pareto front of robust design, Nash equilibrium and 
single-point design. 
 
Fig.7  Drag performances of optimized airfoils. 
6. Conclusions 
Adjoint method is coupled with Pareto, Nash and 
Stackelberg strategies to solve multi-objective aerody-
namic design problems successfully.  
In Pareto front capture, players make decision co-
operatively and dependently because of only one deci-
sion maker in the game, so, they play the equivalent 
roles in the game. In Nash game, the players make 
decisions simultaneously and independently, and no 
player is informed of the choice of any other player 
prior to making its own decision. Moreover, each 
player must be concerned only with its instantaneous 
payoff and ignore the effects of its current action on 
the other players’ future behavior. So players are com-
petitive and conflict. In Stackelberg game, the players 
are not symmetric to each other. Someone plays a cen-
trally controlled role: in other words, it is a leader, 
wherein the other players make decision following him, 
say they are followers. So players are hierarchical and 
noncooperative. 
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